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One  of  the challenges  for drug  treatment  services  is  how  to engage  drug  users  effectively.  This  com-
mentary  examines  one  particular  strategy  for  enhancing  engagement  that  appears  to  have  spread  quite
rapidly  in recent  years:  the  use  of  contract-like  written  agreements  between  treatment  service  providers
and  users.  The  development  of  the  contractual  governance  of  drug  users  in  treatment  is located  in  the
wider  context  of  emerging  social  control  strategies  and  practices.  In particular,  insights  are  drawn  from
the socio-legal  literature  which  has  begun  to  examine  these  new  control  practices  in  diverse  domains.  The
commentary  also reports  on  the  ﬁndings  of  a  national  survey  of  all 149  local  authority  areas  in England
that  was  designed  to  provide  a preliminary  mapping  of  the extent  of contractual  governance  in  treat-
ment  settings  (response  rate  =  62%).  In spite  of the fact that  the use  of  contracts  between  drug  services
and  service  users  does not  feature  in  the  national  drug  policy  framework,  our survey  strongly  indicatesegulation that  it  is a  widespread  practice.  Although  these  agreements  can take  on many  different  forms,  typically
they  set  out the  responsibilities  and  requirements  placed on  users  and,  somewhat  less  frequently,  what
the service  commits  to providing  for them.  This  novel  practice  of contractual  governance  may  be  viewed
as having  considerable  potential  but  it also  raises  important  issues  concerning  justice  and  rights.  We  con-
clude by  arguing  that  this  is  an  important  area  of emerging  practice  which  raises  signiﬁcant  theoretical
and  policy  questions  and  the need  for further  research.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ntroduction
One of the abiding challenges for drug treatment services is how
o engage drug users effectively: to identify and attract them, to
eep them coming and to ensure they comply with what is required
f them. Services which are unable to do this will obviously struggle
o contribute to important drug policy objectives, such as reduc-
ng mortality rates, curbing the spread of blood-borne viruses and
upporting recovery. Effective engagement is the sine qua non of
ffective treatment.
Over the years, many innovations have been introduced to
eal with engagement and retention problems, including reduc-
ng access thresholds (Finch, Groves, Feinmann, & Farmer, 1995),
stablishing rapid prescribing services (Keene, Stenner, Connor, &
enley, 2007), rewarding attendance and compliance (Prendergast,
odus, Finney, Greenwell, & Roll, 2006; Petry, 2012), developing
utreach services (Needle et al., 2005), making case management
ore ‘assertive’ (Vanderplasschen, Wolf, Rapp, & Broekaert, 2007),
nd using criminal justice leverage (Seddon, 2007a). Inevitably,
here is a mixed picture of success from this diverse range of efforts
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 161 306 6549; fax: +44 161 306 1261.
E-mail address: toby.seddon@manchester.ac.uk (T. Seddon).
955-3959 ©  2013 Elsevier B.V. 
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.and the challenge has far from disappeared. Indeed, to the con-
trary, in an ‘age of austerity’ with public spending budgets across
Europe (and beyond) being squeezed tighter than for many years,
the problem has arguably become even more acute. The need for
drug treatment to demonstrate that it can engage effectively with
its target group is greater than ever.
This commentary examines one strategy for enhancing engage-
ment that appears to have spread quite rapidly in recent years:
the use of contract-like written agreements between treatment
service providers and users. Although these agreements can take
on many different forms, typically they set out the responsibilities
and requirements placed on users and, somewhat less frequently,
what the service commits to providing for them. This novel practice
of contractual governance of drug users in treatment may  be
viewed as having considerable potential, not only to address the
engagement challenge but also to underpin efforts to provide more
personalised social and health care through individualised, tailored
agreements. On the other hand, it may  also be seen to raise seri-
ous ethical issues and concerns about human rights, as it appears
to be based on a model of autonomy and responsibility that is at
odds with conventional notions of addiction (West, 2006; cf. Foddy
& Savulescu, 2006).
It is signiﬁcant that if we look beyond the drug policy ﬁeld, the
emergence of contractual governance is clearly part of a wider set
3 Journa
o
o
p
n
n
c
l
t
t
i
t
t
u
o
l
c
r
b
C
R
f
a
i
e
t
a
i
n
t
b
a
(
b
w
p
T
i
c
r
r
c
d
a
a
m
o
(
t
t
r
s
r
t
w
g
i
h
c
C80 M. Bacon, T. Seddon / International 
f developments in the realm of politics and government at the turn
f the twenty-ﬁrst century (see Crawford, 2003). A key part of our
urpose in this commentary will be to locate the contractual gover-
ance of drug users in treatment in this wider context of emerging
ew social control strategies. In particular, we will draw theoreti-
al, conceptual and empirical insights from the largely socio-legal
iterature which has begun to examine these novel control prac-
ices.
In the ﬁrst section of the commentary, we introduce some of
he key conceptual building blocks for our enquiry, speciﬁcally, the
deas of ‘contract’ and ‘contractual governance’. We  then turn, in
he second part, to a consideration of some of the particular issues
hat may  arise in relation to the contractual governance of drug
sers in treatment settings and include a review of the small body
f literature in this area. In the third section, we present some pre-
iminary ﬁndings from the ﬁrst stage of an empirical study we  are
urrently conducting. Finally, in conclusion, we map  out a future
esearch agenda to advance understanding of what we believe to
e a signiﬁcant development in the ﬁeld.
ontracts and contractual governance
The idea of legally binding promises can be traced as far back as
oman law (Nicholas, 1975). The concept of contract emerged in a
orm that we would recognise today in the late eighteenth century,
t around the same time as the birth of modern industrial capital-
sm. In this sense, contracts, as a mechanism for ordering economic
xchange, are foundational to modernity. As Atiyah’s (1979) magis-
erial legal history demonstrated, the fortunes of the contract rose
nd fell during the 19th and 20th centuries, but in recent decades
t has once again taken on a renewed centrality in social and eco-
omic life (Vincent-Jones, 2000, 2006). We  will return in due course
o consideration of this ‘renewal’ but we must ﬁrst address a more
asic question: what is a contract?
A standard deﬁnition in common law is that a contract is an
greement giving rise to obligations that are recognised by law
Furmston, 2006). From this perspective, contracts form social
onds, structure relationships and act as instruments through
hich the separate and potentially conﬂicting interests of the
arties are brought to a shared and mutually beneﬁcial purpose.
here is usually an assumption that parties to a contract have what
s known as ‘contractual capacity’. By providing legal remedies if a
ontracting party fails to perform their duties or comply with the
equirements of the contract, they also act as a mechanism for social
egulation.
In certain important respects, however, this classic, legalistic
oncept of contract is unduly narrow and fails to capture the every-
ay realities of contractual arrangements. Teubner (2007, pp. 52–3)
rgues that the legal institution of the contract has ‘fragmented into
 multiplicity of different operations, each occurring in a different
utually-closed discourse’. These operations include not only legal
bligations but also economic transactions and ‘productive acts’
see also Black, 2004, 2007; Gilbert, 1996). Macneil (1980) makes
he simple yet signiﬁcant observation that the ‘bindingness’ of con-
ractual obligations can be attributed to social norms as well as legal
ules and institutions. The idea that contracts create both legal and
ocial obligations is developed further by Collins (1999), who  uses a
egulation perspective to demonstrate that a contract does not have
o be legally enforceable to create contractual relations. Indeed, his
ork highlights the ways in which contracts provide normative
uides to behaviour that inﬂuence the conduct of the parties even
f they do not actually constitute legally binding agreements. In fact,
e argues that the law actually plays only a minor role in practice,
ompared to the extra-legal dimensions of contractual relations.
ollins (1999, p. 15) suggests that a contract is best understood as ‘al of Drug Policy 24 (2013) 379– 384
form of communication system’ which “‘thinks” about the relation
between people in a particular way’.
Andersen (2008, p. 84) argues similarly that contracts establish
a speciﬁc medium through which people can observe and commu-
nicate with each other. Both Collins and Andersen draw attention
to the fact that the construction of contractual identities, roles and
responsibilities is signiﬁcantly shaped by the social context from
which the relations arise. Likewise, they stress the need to acknowl-
edge that the performance of contractual duties is affected by the
setting and circumstances within which they are embedded and
performed. It is evident, then, that in order to study the use of con-
tracts in any setting, we  must go beyond the texts of agreements
and investigate the environment in which they function.
In recent decades, the contract has risen to a new social and eco-
nomic prominence. Most notably, since the 1980s, there have been
concerted efforts to introduce a range of contractual terminolo-
gies, principles and mechanisms into the running and regulation
of the state, with ‘new public management’ reforms designed to
introduce markets to the public sector in order to promote greater
economy, efﬁciency and effectiveness (Hood, 1991; Osborne and
Gaebler, 1992). Enabling this development is what Vincent-Jones
(2006) has termed the ‘new public contracting’, the emergence of
which has fundamentally restructured the functions and activi-
ties of the state and the organisation of public service. Not only
have relationships between state institutions and their policy-
making procedures become increasingly structured by contracts,
but central and local governments are increasingly outsourcing and
entering into contracts with public, private and voluntary sector
agencies in order to pursue public policy goals. This has been very
evident in the drug treatment sector. In the UK, for example, local
multi-agency Drug and Alcohol Action Teams (DAATs) enter into
service level agreements with a range of providers.
At the same time as this internal reconﬁguring of the ‘state’,
social relationships between state agencies and citizens are also
being regulated more and more through a variety of mechanisms
that resemble contracts. These have emerged across a very diverse
set of domains, from home-school agreements in education to
behavioural contracts in public housing. In both appearance and
effect, these mechanisms constitute distinctive new forms of con-
tract, as their purpose is neither to facilitate economic exchange nor
to regulate the provision of services but rather to modify and con-
trol speciﬁc behaviours – hence Mackenzie (2008) refers to them as
‘control contracts’. More speciﬁcally, they are aimed at governing
the conduct of individuals who are viewed as socially ‘problematic’
because certain elements of their behaviour breach social norms.
Crawford (2003) has described this phenomenon as the ‘contractual
governance of deviant behaviour’.
We can locate this new practice in the wider context of neo-
liberal responses to the perceived shortcomings of the welfare
state in late modern society. According to Vincent-Jones (2000, pp.
344–5), the use of contracting regimes reﬂects ‘the loss of faith
in state interventions directed at rehabilitation and the view that
clients and offenders are free agents who should accept greater
responsibility for their predicaments’ (see also Jayasuriya, 2002).
In probation and social work, contracts have been used as a
technique of behavioural control since the 1980s. A pioneering
series of papers by Nelken (1987), Nelken (1988), Nelken (1989))
examined the use of ‘contracts’ and ‘working agreements’ as social
work techniques, whilst Cohen (1985, pp. 72–4) observed their
early deployment in the criminal justice context in his seminal
Visions of Social Control. In the 1990s, the UK government, as hap-
pened elsewhere, made the notion of contract the basis for radical
social security reforms as beneﬁt entitlement became conditional
on entering a ‘jobseeker’s agreement’ with an employment ofﬁ-
cer. Home-school agreements were introduced under the School
Standards and Framework Act 1998, whilst the Youth Justice and
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riminal Evidence Act 1999 gave rise to ‘youth offender contracts’
s part of a court sentence. The use of contracts to regulate ‘deviant
ehaviour’ has even entered the virtual world, where millions of
eople are required to agree to be governed by speciﬁc terms
nd conditions before becoming members of online communities
Fairﬁeld, 2008).
As a mode of behavioural control, what is common to these
xamples of contractual governance is that they operate under a
trategy of ‘responsibilization’ (O’Malley, 1992) and are informed
y the principles of what has been termed ‘regulated self-
egulation’ or ‘meta regulation’ (Grabosky, 1995). In other words,
hey are designed to activate what Foucault (1993) described as
self-technologies’, in that their aim is to establish, restore or retune
he internal normative frameworks that citizens use to shape their
erspectives and routine activities. As Andersen (2007, p. 120)
xplains in relation to the citizens’ contract in Denmark, they ‘are
mployed not only to commit clients to a speciﬁc behaviour, but
rst and foremost to commit them to a particular inner dialogue
bout obligation and freedom’. This indicates that a central function
f contractual governance is to communicate social values, norms
nd expectations. In this way, contracts act as directive codes of
ractice that set out how citizens should behave in any given con-
ext and how they should contribute to the maintenance of social
rder. Nelken (1987) found that social workers were able to use
ontracts to help clients identify and understand which of their
otential actions should be acted upon and prioritised. This sug-
ests that a useful way of investigating contractual governance is
y trying to understand how the particular ‘conﬁguration of nor-
ative forces’ (Vincent-Jones, 2000, p. 335) in operation in each
ontext shapes contractual behaviour towards speciﬁc regulatory
bjectives.
We can see then that underpinning control contracts is the
xpectation from the ‘controlling party’ that contracting indi-
iduals will learn to govern themselves through their own
utonomous choices. There is a clear resonance here with the
ork of behavioural economists who talk of redesigning the ‘choice
rchitecture’ to ‘nudge’ people to make ‘better’ choices (Vuchinich
 Heather, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). A related expectation
s that contracts may  create a sense of empowerment and that
his may  make self-regulated compliance more likely. These expec-
ations rest, in turn, on the assumption that the individuals are
ational and competent actors, or at least that they are capable of
cting rationally. In this sense, contractual governance or control
ontracts are rooted in a classic, legal understanding of contractual
apacity.
Commentators have also highlighted a number of concerns
bout control contracts. Fundamentally, it has been questioned
hether the appearance of consent and choice is genuine or
imply an illusion created by the use of contractual terminol-
gy (Sulkunen, 2010). Freedland and King (2003) provide a useful
ormative critique, focusing on the power imbalances and conse-
uent lack of mutuality inherent in the contractual governance of
arginalised groups, arguing that it amounts to an illiberal practice.
or Mackenzie (2008, p. 236), the contractual governance of inci-
ility and undesired behaviour ‘represents a top–down Hobbesian
xercise of state authority rather than anything more voluntary,
onsensual, communitarian or dialogical’. Commenting on the con-
ractual governance of young people, Crawford (2009, p. 177) notes
hat ‘the reality is often one of limited choice, a lack of real options,
nd a weak bargaining position on the part of the young person’.
ndeed, when the state is a party to a contract with a citizen, it is
rguably self-evident that there is a signiﬁcant inequality in bar-
aining power. As a result, the contracting process may  take on
 coercive rather than consensual aspect. This coercive potential
ight seem even more likely to be realised in relation to the con-
ractual governance of vulnerable populations.l of Drug Policy 24 (2013) 379– 384 381
Contractual governance in drug treatment settings
It is notable that despite the apparent novelty of the examples
Crawford and others describe, in the drug treatment sector we can
ﬁnd examples of the use of contracts going back to the early 1970s. A
number of North American studies in the 1970s and 1980s exam-
ined the use of what was termed ‘contingency contracting’ with
drug users. This was a technique of controlling behaviour that orig-
inated in behavioural psychiatry and was  based on the principles
of operant conditioning. Stuart (1971, p. 3) described it in the fol-
lowing way, which makes very clear the lineage to contemporary
contractual governance:
Contracts structure reciprocal exchanges by specifying who is to
do what, for whom,  under what circumstances. They therefore
make explicit the expectations of every party to an interaction
and permit each to determine the relative beneﬁts and cost to
him of remaining within that relationship.
Boudin et al. (1977) considered the application of contin-
gency contracting to help heroin addicts gain control of their
routine activities in their natural environment. The contingent
consequences for the fulﬁlment and nonfulﬁllment of contracted
behaviours included the provision of ﬁnancial resources and the
increasing responsibility for self-management. Similarly, Beatty
(1978) investigated the effect of contingency contracting with
heroin addicts living in a ‘halfway house’ environment. The ﬁnd-
ings of his study showed that the implementation of contracts
did signiﬁcantly increase their performance of certain contracted
behaviours (e.g. reporting drug urges and use and attending sched-
uled therapy meetings), although simply signing a written contract
stating that these behaviours were to be performed did little to
alter the actual level of performance. Beatty (1978, p. 525) con-
cludes by suggesting that contracting can be an effective technique
for regulating behaviour, ‘but only if reinforcers offered to the
clients are meaningful to them’. Anker and Crowley (1982) car-
ried out a similar study of cocaine users in specialised clinics
which produced comparable ﬁndings, whereas Dolan, Black, Penk,
Robinowitz, and DeFord (1985) and Magura, Casriel, Goldsmith,
Strug, and Lipton (1988) evaluated the effectiveness of contingency
contracting interventions on reducing illicit drug use by methadone
maintenance outpatients. Magura et al. (1988, p. 117) discovered
that patients perceived the reinforcement of desired behaviours
by controlling consequences through contracts as ‘reasonable’ and
as ‘making it easier to stay clean’. Drug workers in the study also
indicated that contracting helped them develop treatment relation-
ships and made patients more aware of their problems and the
options available to them.
Moving into the 1990s, the idea of contracting seemed to
disappear from the drug treatment literature, whilst the use of con-
tingencies or rewards as a tool for behaviour management began
to ﬂourish. Rebranded as ‘contingency management’, reward-based
interventions share with the earlier ‘contingency contracting’ tech-
nique an assumption that the behaviour of drug users can be
controlled or shaped by manipulating its consequences through
positive reinforcement. For example, it is assumed that drug users
will use street drugs less if they are offered ‘vouchers’ for providing
negative drug-test samples. Similarly, although more controver-
sially, access to affordable housing and work opportunities have
been made contingent on negative drug tests (Milby et al., 2003).
Therapists have also used vouchers to reinforce the development
of social skills and activities (Iguchi, Belding, Morral, Lamb, &
Husband, 1997). A meta-analysis of the research evidence carried
out by Prendergast et al. (2006) found strong support for the effec-
tiveness of contingency management as an approach for reducing
drug use and improving attendance and retention in drug treatment
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rograms. Indeed, the literature indicates that treatments which
ncorporate adjunctive contingency management are more effec-
ive than the same treatments without such techniques (Petry,
012). Despite this relatively strong evidence base, there has been
 variable take-up around the world of contingency management
n drug treatment settings. In the UK, for example, it has been quite
imited so far, although there is currently a programme of research
nderway which includes two randomised trials and its use has
lso been recommended for some years in clinical guidance.
From our own contacts with treatment services in the UK in
ecent years, we have observed that, rather than a rise of con-
ingency management, what has actually unfolded has been the
re-)emergence and subsequent proliferation of contracting in such
ettings. As far as we are aware, this development has occurred
argely under the radar, going almost entirely unnoticed, undoc-
mented and certainly unresearched. Yet, in our view, there are
ome signiﬁcant issues at stake here.
There is, ﬁrst of all, the question of contractual capacity that
e have already referred to. Put simply, are drug users mentally
apable of deciding to enter into binding agreements with drug
reatment services? And is it appropriate to consider them to be
ound by such contracts? These are not easy questions to answer,
ot least because the concept of mental capacity is difﬁcult to
eﬁne, let alone measure, but they highlight signiﬁcant ethical con-
erns. Notwithstanding the fact that control contracts will rarely
e legally enforceable, we can nevertheless usefully draw insights
rom how the law has approached this question. English common
aw recognises certain classes of persons who are generally not
onsidered to be capable of contracting because of the existence
f a range of cognitive or other impairments, the most relevant
or our purposes being mentally impaired persons or persons of
nsound mind (Hart v O’Connor [1985]; Irvani v Irvani [2000]). If
uch persons enter into a contract it is generally considered to be
oidable rather than void – that is, it is presumed to be enforce-
ble but for the capacity of one of the parties which permits them
o avoid their otherwise valid contractual obligations. The Mental
apacity Act 2005 provides a more general legal framework for reg-
lating issues relating to persons who lack capacity. According to
ection 2(1), ‘a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the
aterial time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation
o the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the
unctioning of, the mind or brain’. It goes on to explain in section
(1) that a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is
nable: (a) to understand the information relevant to the decision;
b) to retain that information; (c) to use or weigh that information
s part of the process of making the decision; or (d) to communicate
is decision. This illustrates the complexity of the notion of mental
apacity but, at the same time, also points to how it might start to
e operationalised by researchers and practitioners in appraising
he situation for individual cases.
A second, related, issue concerns the potential for ‘undue inﬂu-
nce’. Again, legal approaches to this question are instructive
Madoff, 1997; Smith, 1997; Lucy, 1989). In basic terms, the law
ecognises that undue inﬂuence occurs when one party to a con-
ract has exercised such a strong inﬂuence over the other that his
r her autonomy of decision-making is substantially undermined.
t does not question the person’s ability to understand the choice
hat they made, but rather looks at the issue of whether the decision
as made freely. The nature and operation of undue inﬂuence in the
odern law was considered by the House of Lords in eight appeals
eard together and reported as Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge
2001]. According to the principles set out in the speech of Lord
icholls unacceptable conduct ‘arises out of a relationship between
wo persons where one has acquired over another a measure
f inﬂuence, or ascendancy, of which the ascendant person then
akes unfair advantage’. The courts have ruled that drug addictionl of Drug Policy 24 (2013) 379– 384
is not a basis for a presumption of inﬂuence (Irvani v Irvani [2000]).
In the Etridge case, their Lordships considered that it was only
where the duties of care and conﬁdence arose as a matter of law by
virtue of the relationship between the parties that there is a true
presumption of inﬂuence. While it has been stated that the relations
which fall into this category cannot be listed exhaustively, they
include the relationship between doctor and patient. This raises the
question of whether we might view the relationship between drug
worker and service user in a similar light, such that there might be
a (rebuttable) presumption of inﬂuence.
A third matter relates to the theoretical signiﬁcance of this
development. As we have seen, conﬂicting understandings of
the autonomy and capacities of drug users bring out important
ethical–legal concerns (see also: Husak, 1999; Morse, 2006; Foddy
& Savulescu, 2006). But they also pose an intellectual puzzle: what
kind of citizen-subject is understood simultaneously as endowed
with contractual capacity (rational, autonomous, ‘in control’) and,
at the same time, as requiring treatment to repair a damaged
‘will’ (characterised by irrationality and ‘loss of control’)? Engag-
ing with this paradox of freedom has been identiﬁed as central
to cutting-edge inquiry into the contemporary governance of drug
users (O’Malley, 2004; Reith, 2004; Seddon, 2007b). The operation
of contractual governance in treatment settings provides an impor-
tant site in which we  can explore the parameters and signiﬁcance of
this paradox. What does it tell us about the nature and functioning
within treatment of the inter-locking constructs of ‘responsibility’,
‘will’, ‘motivation’ and ‘addiction’? Or, to put it more simply, what
kind of person is a drug user in treatment who  is made subject to
one of these control contracts (Seddon, 2011)?
A study of contractual governance in the English treatment
system
In this section of the commentary, we move on to introduce an
empirical study we  are conducting on contractual governance in
drug treatment. This is a multi-site, multi-methods study designed
to map  out and critically examine this emerging practice. The ﬁrst
phase, on which we  report here, has involved a national survey to
map  the extent and spread of the use of contractual governance
techniques within treatment services in England.
There is no single, complete or up-to-date treatment service
database for England in existence. We  therefore sent the survey ini-
tially via email to the commissioning and coordinating managers
of Drug and Alcohol Action Teams (DAATs). At the time of the study
there were a total of 149 DAATs in England, each partnership area
being coterminous with the geographical boundaries of either their
county or unitary local authority. Aside from being easily identi-
ﬁable and relatively accessible, the logic behind surveying DAAT
managers was  that they are responsible for the local commissioning
of drug treatment and could therefore act as valuable informants
and gatekeepers to the services in their areas. Non-response to the
initial contact was followed up by two reminder emails and then
a telephone call. The overall achieved response rate for the survey
was 62 per cent.
Survey respondents were asked a short series of questions about
whether any of the services they commissioned currently made
use of any agreements that resembled contracts with their service
users, how widespread the practice was  and which particular ser-
vices used them. Follow-up questions were asked in response
to answers with the aim of ﬁlling any gaps in the information,
clarifying ambiguities and eliciting general views on contractual
agreements as tools in the drug treatment process. As a result of
this approach to conducting the survey, as well as a quantitative
map  of the extent of the phenomenon, we also generated some
useful qualitative insights from email exchanges and telephone
conversations.
M.  Bacon, T. Seddon / International Journa
Table  1
The use of contracts in drug treatment settings in England.
Region Response rate Contracts in use
East Midlands 4/9 2/4
East of England 8/10 6/8
London 16/33 15/16
North East England 6/12 5/6
North West England 14/22 12/14
South East England 13/19 12/13
South West England 10/15 9/10
West Midlands 10/14 7/10
Yorkshire & Humber 11/15 10/11
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contractual governance in treatment settings. What do the partiesTotal 92/149 (62%) 78/92 (85%)
Although the use of contracts between drug services and service
sers does not feature in the national drug policy framework, our
urvey indicated that it was a widespread, indeed near-ubiquitous,
ractice. Excluding non-responders, 85 per cent of the local areas
n England conﬁrmed the use of contracts by some or all of the
roviders in their locality. This strongly indicates that the con-
ractual governance of drug users is a common practice within
he English treatment system. By clustering DAAT partnership
reas within regions, the data presented in Table 1 shows how
idespread the practice is across the whole country.
Of the 14 areas where contracts were not currently being used,
ve commissioners reported that they had been used by previ-
us providers or by existing providers previously. These services
ere contacted by telephone for informal interview, as it was  felt
hey might have particular insights on the appropriateness and
ffectiveness of contractual devices in drug treatment. One service
anager explained why he decided to discontinue the practice:
The [contracts] in place at the time appeared punitive and
unenforceable. Collaborative, individualised care planning with
regular review was felt to be more effective.
Drug Service Manager, East of England
Another manager made a similar observation, also highlight-
ng the issue that we have discussed of the potential for undue
nﬂuence:
[T]here were problems in that some service users didn’t want
to sign it but worried that treatment would be withdrawn or
not given if they didn’t. The feeling was it was  too draconian –
and the content should be reinforced through good key working
anyway.
Drug Service Manager, North East England
In conducting the survey, it also became very evident that
n some treatment services, an individual could be governed by
ultiple contracts. For example, a service manager described the
ollowing in an email response:
In speaking with my  colleagues and a few practitioners we
believe that there are at least four identiﬁable “contracts”
between the service/key worker and client. (1) The Care Plan
(this is thought to be the central or main contract and there will
be various agreed actions between client and key worker as the
plan develops); (2) The Patients Charter; (3) Prescription Col-
lection Contract; and (4) The Prescribing Contract (a three way
signed agreement between the client, the pharmacist and the
key worker). There is also the ‘permission to share’ form but I
have not included this as even though the client signs it, theyl of Drug Policy 24 (2013) 379– 384 383
then have a passive role and it is the service that is contracted
to stay within the clients chosen agencies that we  can share
information with.
Drug Service Manager, South East England
To summarise, then, the survey revealed that there are many
types of contract-like agreements in operation through which ser-
vices structure their relationships with service users and attempt
to modify and control speciﬁc behaviours. Examples that we  came
across included: Agreement on Urine Testing; Behaviour Contract;
Client Code of Conduct Agreement; Conﬁdentiality Statement;
Consent to Share Information Form; Contract for Clients Being Pre-
scribed; House Rules; Pharmacy Contract; Re-engaging Agreement;
Service User Contract; Service User’s Rights and Responsibili-
ties; The Service User’s Charter; Treatment Agreement. Indeed,
arguably, even ‘care plans’ (sometimes know as treatment or recov-
ery plans) – which are a required element of treatment in the
English system – effectively act as contractual agreements, in the
sense that they constitute an agreed joint plan between the service
and the user. From this perspective, it could be argued that all drug
treatment services in England essentially engage in at least one
form of contractual governance through care planning.
Although they go by various names, take various forms and
relate to various aspects of the treatment process, these documents
typically spell out what is expected of the service user and what the
service will provide in return. Viewed collectively, they provide evi-
dence of how the behaviour of drug users in contact with treatment
is increasingly governed through a ‘maze of contracts’ (Crawford,
2003, p. 480).
Conclusion
Our aim in this article has been to set out a platform for enquiry
into what we  believe to be a highly signiﬁcant development in
the ways that drug treatment services relate to and engage with
drug users. The proliferation of techniques of contractual gover-
nance has attracted little attention to date but arguably has led to
an important reshaping of contemporary treatment practices.
The ﬁrst phase of our empirical study, on which we have
reported here, has generated three principal ﬁndings. First, con-
tractual governance techniques are now widespread across the
treatment system in England. Our national survey found that 85% of
responding Local Authority areas reported some use of contracts.
Second, contracts used in treatment settings take on a variety of
forms and are deployed for a range of purposes at different stages
in the treatment process. They are not solely used at treatment
entry. Third, individual service users are often subject to several
agreements or contracts at the same time, indicating that a com-
plex web  of controls is in play rather than a single form or channel
of governance.
A future research agenda will need to focus on examining how
contractual governance operates in this domain. This will require
an in-depth understanding of the contexts in which agreements
are deployed. As Teubner (2007, p. 55) notes, the ‘nature of the
contract ﬁnds its basis in the inescapable hermeneutic differences
of the different social contexts in which the individual contract is
situated’. In other words, contractual relations emerge from spe-
ciﬁc social contexts and so can only be properly understood as
situated relationships and practices. We  therefore need to ask a
series of contextualised questions about the different instances ofunderstand the particular agreement to be? Do they consider them-
selves ‘bound’ by it? What is the source of this ‘bindingness’? How
does the agreement affect their expectations of what the other
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arty will do? How does it shape their own behaviour? What do
hey think ‘breach’ of the agreement might consist of? How should
t be responded to? These types of questions will need to be pursued
hrough detailed qualitative research studies in different settings.
This research agenda will contribute to the development of
mportant new knowledge and understanding about the value of
ontractual governance techniques for the crucial processes of drug
reatment engagement, retention and effectiveness. These are vital
spects of drug policy debates around the world. We  also believe
hat these enquiries will speak to wider debates amongst ‘law
nd society’ scholars about the nature of contemporary strategies
nd practices for the regulation of the behaviour of ‘minority’ or
deviant’ groups and the profound questions of justice and rights
hat they raise.
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